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Abstract— This paper proposes a decision-making framework
for Connected Autonomous Vehicle interactions. It provides and
justifies algorithms for strategic selection of control references
for cruising, platooning and overtaking. The algorithm is based
on the trade-off between energy consumption and time. The
consequent cooperation opportunities originating from agent
heterogeneity are captured by a game-theoretic cooperative-
competitive solution concept to provide a computationally fea-
sible, self-enforced, cooperative traffic management framework.




ODAY’S paradigm of road vehicle operation is far from
optimal: individual human drivers compete for space
without means to understand one another’s intentions. They
lack understanding of fuel-efficient vehicle operation and are
vulnerable to fatigue. As a result, the velocity profiles are very
variable, saturated with many deceleration and acceleration
events and high peak velocities. All of these maneuvers cause
demand for oversized powertrains, waste energy and increase
air pollution.
The largest contributors to the energy inefficiency are break-
ing and aerodynamic drag. The former can be minimized
by the elimination of traffic uncertainty. The latter, since
drag is roughly proportional to the square of velocity, can
be addressed by careful optimal selection of the cruising
velocity. The proposed framework provides an algorithm for
the selection of optimal maneuvers in a cooperative manner.
Neglecting tire slip losses, which occur at the limit of han-
dling, any maneuver can be viewed as a velocity transient.
Velocity, in turn is a trade-off between time elapsed and energy
efficiency. An optimization algorithm defines a cost function,
with a minimizer as optimal cruising velocity. It is followed
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by a scenario where the Ego Vehicle (EV), while cruising
at its optimal velocity, encounters an Obstacle Vehicle (OV)
ahead. Today, the solution is to either merely platoon behind,
losing time, or waiting for an overtake window of unknown
size, wasting energy and compromising safety. Information
exchange, however, enables understanding of the other agent’s
objectives and provides means to find a mutually optimal
strategy. The condition of self-enforcement removes the need
for legislative effort.
The literature indicates clarity in the direction road transport
is heading: the emergence of driverless and automated traffic
[1] is a matter of time. Such vehicles will be equipped
with high computational power and machine-based situational
awareness, which shall be supplied not only by the onboard
sensors, but also by means of cooperative perception and nego-
tiation [2] mediated by vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) wireless communication systems [3].
Given that these technologies are rapidly developing [4],
information exchange is assumed to be complete and perfect,
meaning no information is lost.
Very narrow scope of research addresses the problem of
optimal cruise velocity selection [5], [6]. Both view velocity
as a trade-off between energy and time, but introduce a
subjective, abstract parameter to control the bias.
Platooning, where vehicles follow one another, has been
considered from traffic stability [7] and cooperative sens-
ing [2] perspective. The decrease of aerodynamic drag has
also received considerable attention [8]. However, there is
no research addressing the multi-agent dynamics of platoon
formation.
Autonomous overtaking has received a lot of attention
already. Research focuses on the theoretical background to
guide further development and harmonization of the lateral and
longitudinal controls or the technical requirements to handle
it [9], [10]. More recent studies propose a division of the
maneuver into three phases to apply adaptive control algorithm
[11], or application of spacecraft rendezvous algorithms to
approach the problem [12]. Most importantly, [13] studies
the feasibility of autonomous overtaking performed by Model
Predictive Control, taking the safety and comfort as objectives.
The cost function is defined to penalize deviation from the
reference velocity and trajectory, taking into account the
distance to the oncoming vehicle. However, the formulated
method assumes no cooperativity and does not track energy
consumption or time. The application of automated driving
technology by a number of companies [14], [15] indicates
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a necessity for studies on the energy efficiency of scenarios
which such vehicles may encounter.
There are a number of approaches to cooperation on
intersections, either centralized [16], [17], or decentralized
[18]; with hardware demonstration ready [5]. Cooperation
is facilitated by numerous intersection management schemes
[19]–[21]. All of these publications consider the throughput of
intersections, while neglecting agents’ individual preferences
and self-enforcement, so are dedicated for high-density traffic.
Additionally, a vehicle may change lanes, or merge into an
intersections - conflict problems which fit into a game theoretic
formulation with promising results [22]–[24].
Game Theory has has also found application in hybrid
powertrain control systems to predict user behaviour [25] or
distributed control for unmanned aerial vehicle formation [26].
All state-of-the-art traffic optimization frameworks assume
agents to be homogeneous, neglecting the differences between
them and thus the negotiation aspect. While the threat of
congestion makes such arrangement self-enforceable, it is not
optimal. The authors consider the heterogeneity and emergent
capability for negotiation derived from the properties of non-
zero sum games. This approach captures also the human,
individualistic aspect of the problem [27]–[30] to offer a novel,
user-centric framework for negotiation of traffic scenarios
between connected traffic agents in low and medium intensity
traffic. The negotiation in a distributed topology requires
means of payment to enforce it, what has been proposed in a
form of a traffic intersection algorithm [21] and a block-chain
based mechanism is being implemented [31].
The problem is formulated to find optimal references, con-
sidering the resources managed: energy consumed by vehicles
and value of time of users.
Research on Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) lacks
studies on the selection of optimal velocity. When the decision
is only constrained by safety speed limits, the velocities might
be much higher than necessary from the energy perspective.
We propose that cruising velocity selected is a trade-off
between the cost of vehicle operation, and the time understood
as the user’s value of time as an opportunity cost [32].
This notion is analogous to the Airline Cost Index used as
decision-making factor in aircraft operation, which, due to its
confidential nature cannot be used to automated Air Traffic
Control [33].
While optimisation algorithms are employed for single deci-
sion agents, as two self-optimizing agents meet, the conflict
between agents’ objectives is modelled by a game theory.
An explicit, self-enforced solution concept is employed to for-
mulate the agent intentions into a single optimisation problem.
The agents are thus assumed to be honest, which eliminates
the safety-critical risk of adversary’s defect and allows for
fine refinement of the solution, by means of cooperative-
competitive (co-co) solution concept [34]. The co-co solution
eliminates also the need for finding Nash equilibrium, which
belongs to NP-hard complexity class [35].
This paper consists of five Sections. Section II presents
an outline of the framework developed. Section III proposes
the mathematical formulation and assumptions on which it
is developed. Section IV provides simulation results and
Fig. 1. Decision tree for a scenario where a slower vehicle ahead is
encountered. A decision whether to overtake or platoon is negotiated and
optimal velocity profiles are selected from energy optimality point of view.
Section V concludes the paper discussing the results and
further work.
II. THE AUTOMATED NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK
The conceptualized framework is geared to balance vehi-
cle’s resource utilization, that is both energy and user’s time,
in accordance with the user-specified objective. With cost
function defined, the decision objectives is to minimize it. The
simplest scenario is a free cruise, where vehicle maintains an
optimal cruising velocity V ∗. Then the cruising interruption
scenario: a slower vehicle ahead can be resolved by either
platooning or an overtake, according to the decision tree
presented in Fig. 1. Given that platooning causes a delay and
excessive speed and overtaking costs energy, but mitigates the
delay, the best agreeable maneuver strategies are found: pla-
tooning velocity VP , or overtake velocity profiles V
OV T
n and
the cheapest variant is selected. The payment p is exchanged
to facilitate cooperation and share the benefit.
This framework also carries a capability to empower future
users of CAV to adjust their operating strategy based on
journey’s objective, providing an added value not only of
refined energy optimization, but also a sense of system’s
agility, beyond that of a public transport system [36]. The users
would be able to define their cost of time delay, thereby influ-
encing the cost function’s profile. It may provide a sense of
control and ownership over the vehicle, possibly mitigating an
important factor deterring people from CAV ownership [37].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The proposed framework assumes that all vehicle opera-
tion consists of cruising or handling cruising obstacle, either
joining a platoon or performing an overtake. With these
assumptions in mind, we can identify the input parameters
required, listed in Tab. I, and the decision variables for each
event, which are listed in Tab. II.
While refined vehicle models improve result precision,
the main objective of the paper is to propose and study
dynamics of applied negotiation algorithm. Simplistic vehicle
models are thus applied for clarity, as there is little novelty
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in already researched powertrain models [38]. The powertrain
model is defined in Appendix A
Each vehicle has a set of constants defining it: mass mn ,
rolling resistance µroll,n , aerodynamic area A, drag coefficient
Cd , powertrain efficiency ηP , unit cost of energy source
CE,n and longitudinal distance X S , from which the energy
consumption is found. At the beginning of every journey,
the user selects his personal cost of time delay CT ,n .
A. Game-Theoretic Solution Concept
In the proposed approach, two or more self-optimizing
agents meet with different, but not mutually exclusive objec-
tives. Thanks to properties described below, agents may then
agree on a globally optimal solution and share the benefit,
according to their negotiative power. Equilibrium seeking
approaches to GT do not require enforcement, but are compu-
tationally expensive and cannot guarantee the payoff-dominant
solution [35]. In this approach, a GT is used to break the multi-
agent problem into an optimisation problem. It is incentivised
by a promise of optimal solution, a self-enforced cooperation
can be achieved by a cooperative-competitive (co-co) solution
concept [34], which guarantees the Pareto-optimal equilibrium
at low computational cost. The threat of cost wasted by a
maneuver interrupted by the adversary’s agreeability constraint
and promise of efficiency justify the choice of the solution
concept. The problem of the system’s sensitivity to agent
honesty is not straightforward and is discussed in Appendix C.
If agents are heterogeneous, their interaction is a non-zero
sum game. If they are willing to communicate, they can adopt
a pair of strategies (u#1, u
#
2) which minimize the combined,
cooperative cost J #sum as
J #sum = minu1,u2
(
J1(u1, u2) + J2(u1, u2)
)
(1)
where J #sum is the total, combined cost of cooperative strate-
gies.
In the pair of strategies yielding J #sum , one of the agent’s
best strategy J ∗n may be better, however, than J
#
n , which is
not agreeable unless an incentive is provided. The benefiting
agent needs to provide a side payment p = J ♭ to compensate,
guaranteeing under threat of rejection, that





Fig. 2. Proposed slider with example values of the cruise time and cost,
to interface user’s intention with the system.
As proposed in [39], the payment should be proportional to
the players’ power (relative values of J ∗n ), and contribution to
the common achievement. The payoffs are divided as follows:
J #split =






J1(u1, u2) − J2(u1, u2)
2
. (4)
With such division, we can split the game as a sum of a
purely cooperative game. Where players have payoffs J #n ,










+ J ♭, J2 =
J #
2
− J ♭. (5)
B. Cruising
The cost of opportunity is intended to be selected by the
user of the vehicle, as a mean of expressing their intention
as to how much they value their time and can be viewed as
value of time CT . It is defined by the user together with the
destination of the journey and can be interfaced by a trade-off
slider as in Fig. 2.
If we then consider that the intention is to move a distance
S, in some steps δS, and V is the rate of movement, then,
















The energy is found in a similar manner from the propulsive
force necessary to maintain a steady state velocity v, consider-
ing the powertrain efficiency ηP , aerodynamic characteristics








ρair Cd A v
2 + gµroll v d S. (8)
Then the value of the unit of energy consumed by the
powertrain is defined as CE , and the overall cost function of
each agent n is then a balance between time and energy
cJn(v) = CE E(v) + CT T















C = 0 D = CT . (10c)
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Fig. 3. Activity diagram of the communication needed to find agreeable
strategy.
The optimal cruise velocity V ∗ which minimizes the cost
function is then found as






The minimal cost per unit distance, i.e. the cruising cost CC ,
corresponding to V ∗, is defined as
CC,n = Jn(V
∗
n ) = minv
Jn(v). (12)
The cost function is convex given that the derivative of the
cost function (10) with respect to velocity assumes the form
d Jn
dv




which, when solved for V ∈ R+ has only one root, guaran-
teeing a unique minimum.
C. Cooperative Interaction Handling
With the cost function for cruising velocity proposed above,
the heterogeneity of agents makes the co-co solution capable
to enable cooperation without enforcement. Fig. 3 presents the
activity diagram of the algorithm.
As an agent meets an obstacle, it requests adversary’s
preference parameters and finds the best maneuver, which is
proposed and agreed upon or rejected, limiting the negotiation
communication to four messages.
D. Platooning
If a cruising vehicle encounters a slower vehicle or a
platoon ahead, one of the solutions is to request an increase
of the velocity, incentivizing it with payment. The proposed
approach, assumes that vehicles share their local cost function
TABLE III
PLATOONING PAYOFF MATRIX MP,n






= Jn(v) − CC,n, (14)
or, as the minus cruise cost CC,n value defining constant
C (10c). The local cost functions jEV (v) and jOV (v), for
platooning velocities between V ∗EV and V
∗
OV , when discretized
with a step V , form a payoff matrix MP,n , as in Tab. III.
It defines the influence of agents strategies on each other. Since
any set of strategies outside of the diagonal of the matrix
would be infeasible from a safety perspective, information
loss is neglected and the solution concept enables precise,
cooperative strategy selection, values not on the diagonal are
rejected.
The payoffs from diagonals of MP,EV and MP,OV are then
summed as
jP(v) = jEV (v) + jOV (v) (15)




subject to agreeability constraint
0 ≤ jEV (VP) − jOV (VP). (17)
Then, the initiating agent proposes a platooning velocity VP .
The cost of the OV’s departure from V ∗OV is covered by the
EV’s payment pP = jOV (VP ).
To evaluate the cost of agreeability, the unconstrained






V NCP is the unconstrained minimizer. The Price of Anarchy
(PoA), defining the loss of optimality of the GT solution in







The root of the gradient of jP(v) provides the unconstrained
minimizer
VP ∋ ∇ jP(VP ) = 0. (20)
The agreeability constraint is a line Vagr found on the inter-
section of local cost functions
Vagr ∋ jEV (Vagr.) = jOV (Vagr ). (21)
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
STRYSZOWSKI et al.: FRAMEWORK FOR SELF-ENFORCED OPTIMAL INTERACTION BETWEEN CONNECTED VEHICLES 5
Fig. 4. A simplified overtake model in space domain.





An overtake is an alternative to the platooning strategy. The
economy behind it is to spend energy in order to mitigate the
continuous loss of time when platooning. An energy-focused
overtake model is proposed.
1) Overtake Model: The overtake manoeuvre occurs when
the distance between vehicles X is within the absolute value
of the sum of their safety distances
Xs = Xs,EV + Xs,OV < |X | (23)
from −Xs with the OV in the lead, to +Xs with the EV in
the lead. The total relative distance change during maneuver
is 2 Xs .
The longitudinal distance of manoeuvre is constrained by
the maximal distance available, Smax , when alongside. Then,
the distance of the OV is constrained to
Smax,OV = Smax − (2Xs). (24)
It is assumed that the manoeuvre is performed either at a con-
stant velocity vov t,n or constant acceleration an . The selection
of maneuver accelerations is dependent on numerous control
variables of the vehicle, including battery wear, subjective
user comfort, and safety. In order to focus on the negotiation
algorithm, we have decided to keep an fixed. The factors in
the cost function is the energy and is balanced with time.
So each agent’s decision variable is the the overtake velocity.
Example velocity profiles are presented in Fig. 4.The dynamics
control is neglected, as it has already been addressed [13].
The overtake then consists of three phases: acceleration
at an from V
∗
n to the preselected overtake velocity Vov t,n,
cruising at constant Vov t,n and deceleration back to V
∗
n at −an.
Acceleration rates are assumed constant, leaving Vov t the only
decision variable.
Then, the powertrain model returns energy consumption to
evaluate the energy expense Cov tE,n . The overtake cost is found








Cov tE,n + C
ov t
T ,n. (25)
The manoeuvre is constrained by the oncoming traffic







PAYOFF MATRIX MVovt FOR AN OVERTAKE. THE POSITION M1,N IS PRE-
SENTED AS INFEASIBLE. THE COLUMN AND ROW WITH V ∗n + V IS
NEGLECTED FOR CLARITY
Since the overtake gap is never stationary, a maximal distance
to perform an overtake is derived in Appendix B. Given a gap








This can be viewed as relative velocity being sufficient to pass
before the EV’s distance exceeds Smax . It is assumed that
vehicles coming from the opposite direction have a known,
constant velocity, so the Sgap is constant.
2) Optimal Overtake: With the overtake model as described
above a matrix of possible solutions MVovt is created. Given
a velocity set from V ∗n to maximum overtake velocity V
max
n
discretized with a step V




n +V , . . . , V
max
n }, (28)
the MVovt assumes the form as in Tab. IV.
Then the optimal overtaking manoeuvre is a vector of Vov t,n
which minimizes MVovt
Cov t (VEV , VOV ) = min
V ovtn
(
MVovt (VEV , VOV )
)
. (29)
Vov t,n is found by finding a root of cost function’s gradient
(V ov tEV , V
ov t




OV ) = 0, (30)
subject to feasibiliity constraint






V ov tEV + V
ov t
EV (31)
and powertrain force constraint
Fnet,n < F̂n, (32)
where F̂n is the maximal propulsive force.
Finally, as agreeability condition, payment pov t = C
ov t
OV ,
covering all costs of the manoeuvre on OV’s side is issued,
as the EV would be free to cruise unimpeded.
F. Decision Rule
Having evaluated the cost of platooning CP and the cost of
overtake Cov t , the decision to overtake is selected if
CP SS ≥ Cov t (33)
and platooning otherwise. The EV proposes to OV a feasi-
ble strategy and a payment, which, to ensure enforcement,
must satisfy (2), that is for a maneuver x the strategy is
accepted if
Cx − p ≥ CC (34)
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TABLE V
VEHICLE TYPES AND THEIR DIFFERENTIATING PARAMETERS
Fig. 5. Preference functions for various costs of time. Red curve indi-
cates the trajectory of the functions’ minima, increasing steeply with value
of time.
IV. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
In order to verify the performance of the framework, some
typical scenarios are analysed. Two vehicle types are consid-
ered: a car and a truck. Their individual parameters are listed
in Tab. V. Common parameters are: powertrain efficiency,
assumed ηP = 0.82, rolling resistance µroll = 0.005, and
energy weight, corresponding to its market value CE = 0.12
[$/kWh] [40]. In the overtake problem the acceleration is
an = 2 [m/s] and the model dynamics is discretized with a
timestep t = 0.1 [s]. To model the cost of an overtake, the
integration of the velocity profile is required at every iteration.
This slows down the numerical optimization algorithm.
Together with the intended embedded implementation using
Objective-C language, it has lead us led to select an exhaustive
search for optimization. With the precision of 0.01 [m/s] the
solution takes on average 5.2 [s], however, assuming that the
solution is on the feasibility constraint, what is justified by
the convexity of the cost function, it takes 0.57 [s].
A. Example 1 - Cruising Velocity Selection
The sensitivity of optimal cruising velocity V ∗ to user’s
objective CT is examined. Fig. 5 presents several preference
functions for Car’s V P and the trajectory of the minimizer,
for CT varying between $5 and $55.
B. Example 2 - Negotiation of Platooning for Varying
Vehicle Parameters and User Objectives
The evaluation of departure costs from optimal velocity and
possible solution points are visualized in Fig. 6. Point 1 marks
the cost of a baseline, non-cooperative maneuver, point 2 the
minimal agreeable cost and point 3 the Pareto optimal cost,
which is not feasible under agreeability constraint, as the
payment required to enforce it outweighs the benefit.
Fig. 6. Matching agents’ preferences, to negotiate the optimal strategy for
a 5 km platooing. Point 1 is the noncooperative cost, point 2 the agreeable,
and point 3 is the optimal.
TABLE VI
VEHICLE TYPE AND PREFERENCES FOR EACH CASE
TABLE VII
PLATOONING SOLUTION COSTS AND PRICES OF ANARCHY (18).
IN CASE 1 OPTIMUM IS WITHIN CONSTRAINT
Fig. 7. Sum of platooning cost for 5 km for each case. Vertical line marks the
agreeability constraint. Observe the negotiation power adjusting to the agent
type. The case 1 is the only case where the optimum is within constraint limit.
Points mark the functions’ minima.
The same calculation has been performed for various vehicle
types and CT selected to match V
∗ for different vehicle types,
as in Tab. VI. The results are presented in Fig. 7 and Tab. VII.
Case 1 considers a scenario where a fast car encounters
a slower truck. Case 2 analyses two cars, and Case 3 a
hurrying truck encountering a slower car. Cooperation yields
considerable savings, while agreeability constraint causes
minimal PoA.
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Fig. 8. A projection of the above figure from above, showcasing the
constrained solution space.
Fig. 9. An example of overtake costs surfaces and the feasibility front of
their sum, on which optimal maneuver parameters are found.
C. Example 3 - Overtaking Maneuver
For the same vehicles as in Example 1, the values of MV ovtn
assume the distribution presented in Fig. 9. For small overtake
velocity differences (V ov tEV − V
ov t
OV ), the maneuvers are rejected
as infeasible. The cost increases quickly, leaving the feasibility
boundary as location of the optimal solution. The constraint
on propulsive force rules out solutions for which required
acceleration is not achievable at given V ov t . In the example
presented in Fig. 8 outlines the projection of the surface of
feasible solutions. The constraint is at V ov tEV = 36.9 [m/s].
An isometric view of the result is presented in Fig. 9. The
optimal solution for an overtake gap of 80 [m] is found to be,
in this example, V ov tEV = 34.7 [m/s] and V
ov t
OV = 14.3 [m/s].
D. Example 3 - Sensitivity of Overtake to
Distance Available
Evaluation of an optimal overtake cost as a function of
distance available has been performed. Three cases from Tab.
VI are being considered and results presented in Fig. 10. The
overtake velocities required and total cost of maneuver are
plotted. The cost of maneuver decreases hyperbolically with
overtake gap available.
E. Raspberry Pi Algorithm Implementation
In order to demonstrate the practical applicability of the
proposed framework the algorithm has been implemented in a
Fig. 10. Overtake cost, and payment required for performing an overtake
for changing space available for the maneuver. In range from 40 to 200 m.
Oncoming velocity is 20 m/s. r
Fig. 11. Raspberry Pi displays, respectively, during approach, platooning and
overtake. X is the position, V the velocity, D the distance between vehicles
and P is the payment.
TABLE VIII
CALCULATION TIMES FOR FUNCTIONS ON RASPBERRY PI
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B equipped with a 64bit ARM Cortex-
A53 quad-core CPU with 1.2 GHz frequency and 1 GB RAM.
To demonstrate the negotiation, two boards have been used,
connected by Ethernet and equipped with displays, as shown
in Fig. 11.
The algorithm adheres to the activity diagram from Fig. 3,
but is equipped with additional connectivity and synchronisa-
tion modules.
1) Computational Complexity: To assess the computational
burden, the execution times of the algorithm were measured
using the Raspberry Pi’s clock_gettime() function. twenty
observations were made for platooning and overtake scenar-
ios. The time values obtained are shown in Tab. VIII. The
platooning evaluation function takes less than 0.001 s to
execute, while the overtake evaluation consistently less than
0.4 s. Because the algorithm is to be executed once per
manoeuvre, this example demonstrates its feasibility in real
time application.
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes the application of a game-theoretic
cooperative-competitive approach to the interaction between
CAVs, intending to improve road transport energy effi-
ciency by introducing means to achieving payment-based
self-enforced cooperation. The variation of agent parameters
required to enable cooperation is derived from the proposed
user-defined cost of time. User input may double as a means
of matching vehicles driving style to user’s preference. The
algorithms to compute energy and time economy for cruis-
ing, platooning and overtaking have been provided, example
calculations presented and a hardware-in-the-loop application
demonstrated. Further work includes the implementation of
an intersection model, a hardware-in-the-loop demonstrator
on scaled, automated vehicles and development of the cost




To evaluate energy consumption and cost of the maneuvres,
powertrains are modelled as a quasi-static backward facing
model, following either the steady state velocity or the velocity
profiles presented in Fig. 4 above.
The control variable is the acceleration an , being assumed
constant, as dynamics are not a subject of this study. As the
boundary velocities: V ∗n and V
ov t
n , the time of the acceleration
manoeuvre is found
Ta =





and the time is discretised into T = 1, 2, . . . , i elements with
a timestep tstep. The force required is found by relating to the
balance of forces defined as
Fnet,i,n = FW,i,n − Froll,i,n − Fdrag,i,n (36)
where the FW,i,n is the propulsive force, assumed to represent






where the powertrain efficiency ηP is a product of all pow-
ertrain components ηi,M , ηi,P E , ηi,B , referring, respectively,
to electric motor, power electronics and battery.
The force of rolling resistance is defined as
Froll,i,n = vi,nµroll,i (38)







Vehicle’s state is defined by its acceleration an , velocity vi,n





vi+1,n = vi,n + ai,n tstep, (41)
si+1,n = si,n + vi,n tstep. (42)
Fig. 12. Comparison of truthful and cheated cost function dynamics. X =
{2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.





Friction breaking is neglected here, as any use of breaks is
wasteful from the energy efficiency perspective, and hence,
since the safety is neglected, optimal solutions would never
use it. It may be introduced together with a battery state of
charge and state of health models.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF THE DYNAMIC OVERTAKE GAP LENGTH
Equation (27) for the dynamic overtake gap length Smax
has been derived from the real length of the gap Sgap,
velocity of the gap Vgap, assuming that the velocities of
oncoming vehicles is constant. After factoring the Sgap into
the parentheses the equation (27) is









which then allows to find the distance the oncoming traffic
travels during the overtake
Soncoming = VgapTov t (46)
which is substracted from the static gap, arriving back at (44).
APPENDIX C
PROBLEM OF HONESTY
As the proposed framework features a payment system,
agents may be incentivised to game the system to increase
received payments. Thus to minimize legislative and regulatory
effort to control the traffic, cheating possibilities are examined.
Scenarios’ sensitivity to agent’s dishonesty is considered.
1) Platooning: Given that agents request a payment for
change in velocity, agents may increasing objective’s slope,
while maintaining the same minimizer. It is achievable if
constant parameters of the cost function, as defined in (10b-d)
are swayed by a constant cheating multiplier X. Problem’s
dynamics are presented in Fig. 12. This vulnerability can be
mitigated, however, by demand to share the cruise cost CC,n
as a control value.
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2) Overtake: An overtake is a dynamic event. The Cov t
is sensitive to from vehicle mass (39), which cannot be
inferred from observation. Therefore agents may be inclined
to overvalue it as the payment is proportional to agent’s mass
p ∝ Cnov t . (47)
However, since vehicle other parameters can be measured,
a networked approach to cheating resilient system design could
be considered in future.
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